Russia’s military interests in the Arctic are ostensibly defensive: to defend its second-strike, sea-based nuclear deterrent capability operating out of the Kola Peninsula to defend the homeland and to protect its regional economic endeavors, especially oil and gas megaprojects like the Yamal LNG and Vostok Oil ventures, and the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which Russia views ambitiously as a future global trade thoroughfare. However, the Arctic has not been a top security priority for the United States or NATO in recent years, and there are weighty arguments that this might be a problem that needs addressing as tensions rise. government-wide Arctic strategy since 2013, it states that Russia’s war in Ukraine has “raised geopolitical tensions in the Arctic” and created “new risks of unintended conflict,” a point that is also emphasized in the U.S. Finally, the increased security concerns are also seen in newly released policy documents, such as the U.S. Furthermore, Russian “hybrid tactics”-to now possibly also include the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, as well as that of undersea cables in the Arctic and near-Arctic, among other activities-have raised the level of alarm in NATO members like Norway and nearby states. Next, in search of security, Finland and Sweden requested to join NATO. This left the region without its main intergovernmental venue for cooperation. įirst, the Arctic Council ceased to function when its seven members other than Russia suspended participation in official meetings. This shift was also stark in the Arctic, which had for a long time been hailed by many as a highly cooperative and unusually peaceful part of international affairs. Russia’s unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 disrupted the European security architecture and altered the risk calculus underpinning the foreign and security policies of its neighbors. The United States and NATO will need to take stock of these developments in a region they have not historically prioritized as they begin to implement their new, respective strategies. At the same time, Russia’s use of hybrid tactics in the region seems to be increasing in both frequency and severity. In addition, there are some preliminary indications that sanctions and export controls may diminish Russia’s ability to deploy precision munitions to the Arctic to a degree. The war has not diminished Russia’s core economic and security interests in the region, but it has had some impact on its military readiness there in the short term, especially in terms of ground capabilities, if not at sea or in the air. When Sweden and Finland join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), every Arctic country save Russia will be a member of the U.S.-led alliance. The region’s primary diplomatic venue is paused, and military tensions are increasing. The impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine has been felt in the Arctic.
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